Trump Pushes Xi on Nuclear Arms Talks as Beijing Resists US Pressure
The United States, Russia and China may soon face a difficult diplomatic choice: negotiate new limits on their nuclear arsenals or enter a period with fewer restraints on strategic weapons. U.S. President Donald Trump wants China at the negotiating table. Beijing, however, argues that Washington and Moscow must take the lead in nuclear disarmament because their arsenals remain much larger.
The disagreement is expected to feature when Trump meets Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Shenzhen on Nov. 19. The White House confirmed the unprecedented trilateral meeting on Nov. 13, with nuclear arms reduction among the expected subjects. Trump’s position is clear. White House Assistant Press Secretary Olivia Wales said the president would discuss the “reduction of nuclear weapons in the world,” adding that he considers their proliferation dangerous.
Washington is not expecting an immediate breakthrough. A senior U.S. administration official described the gathering as “the entry point, the first conversation” between the three countries, suggesting that it could begin a longer diplomatic process rather than produce an agreement.
Why Trump Wants China Involved
Trump wants a new nuclear arms-control agreement involving the United States, Russia and China. His proposal would bring the three countries with the largest nuclear arsenals into a common framework rather than leave Beijing’s expanding capabilities outside future negotiations.
For Washington, China’s growing nuclear arsenal has become an increasingly important factor in strategic planning. The administration believes future arms-control arrangements should account for the capabilities of all three powers. A senior U.S. official described China’s nuclear arsenal as growing rapidly and argued that Beijing should participate more actively in negotiations. However, the administration has acknowledged that bringing China into a trilateral framework will not be straightforward. Washington and Moscow have decades of experience negotiating bilateral arms-control agreements. Beijing has consistently resisted joining comparable three-country negotiations.
China Challenges US Pressure
Beijing’s opposition centres on the wide gap between the three countries’ nuclear inventories.
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) January 2026 estimates, Russia possesses about 5,420 nuclear warheads, followed by the United States with 5,042 and China with 620. These figures represent total inventories, including deployed, stored and retired warheads awaiting dismantlement. They should not be confused with the number of weapons currently deployed and available for military use.
That disparity forms the basis of China’s argument that Washington and Moscow should make substantial reductions before Beijing accepts comparable restrictions. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning reiterated this position on Oct. 16. Responding to questions about US claims of nuclear disarmament discussions with Russia and China, she said Beijing had already made its position clear.
“It is neither fair, reasonable nor realistic to ask China to join the so-called trilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations at this stage,” Mao said. She also argued that the United States should fulfil its “special and primary responsibility” for nuclear disarmament because of the size of its arsenal.
New START Expiration Raises Concerns
The proposed negotiations follow the expiration of New START on Feb. 5, 2026, ending the last major bilateral nuclear arms-control treaty between Washington and Moscow. Signed in 2010, the agreement established three central limits for each country. It capped deployed strategic nuclear warheads at 1,550, deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and nuclear-capable heavy bombers at 700, and deployed and non-deployed launchers and heavy bombers at 800.
New START also included verification arrangements, data exchanges and notifications intended to improve transparency between the two countries. On-site inspections, however, had already been suspended before the treaty expired. Putin had proposed that Moscow and Washington voluntarily maintain the treaty’s central limits on deployed strategic nuclear weapons for another year while negotiations continued.
Trump rejected the proposal, instead calling for a “new, improved and modernized” treaty that could include China. The expiration leaves Washington and Moscow without New START’s legally binding numerical limits. Although both countries retain other international obligations, the loss of the treaty removes an important bilateral mechanism for monitoring and constraining their strategic nuclear forces. Creating a replacement involving three countries would introduce additional complications. The governments would need to agree on the categories of weapons covered, acceptable reductions, verification arrangements and each participant’s responsibilities.
Iran Expected, Ukraine Excluded
Nuclear disarmament will not be the only subject raised during the Shenzhen meeting. Trump is expected to discuss Iran with Xi and Putin. Both countries maintain significant diplomatic and strategic relationships with Tehran, making the issue relevant to wider discussions on regional security. However, a senior U.S. official said Ukraine was not expected to feature in the planned trilateral meeting. Washington regards discussions on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a separate diplomatic track because China is not a participant in those negotiations.
The distinction comes amid continuing tensions over Moscow’s war in Ukraine and Beijing’s strategic relationship with Russia.
What The Meeting Could Mean
The Shenzhen gathering could provide an opportunity to reopen discussions on nuclear arms control, but an agreement remains a distant prospect. For Trump, the meeting offers a chance to advance his proposal for a broader framework involving Washington, Moscow and Beijing. For Xi, China’s participation would require addressing longstanding concerns about unequal nuclear stockpiles and the responsibilities of the established nuclear powers.
Putin’s position will also be important following New START’s expiration and his earlier proposal to maintain its central limits voluntarily. Any meaningful negotiations would require agreement on nuclear warhead limits, delivery systems, verification mechanisms and the pace of reductions. The three governments would also need to establish how their different security concerns could be accommodated. The central challenge will be whether Washington, Moscow and Beijing can move beyond competing demands over nuclear reductions and establish a framework that addresses the security concerns of all three powers.
