Trump and Putin have accidentally saved NATO | Opinion

In the Oval Office, Mark Rutte used the “Trump trillion” to argue that NATO’s “paper tiger” days are over. The alliance heading to this week’s Ankara summit is stronger, better armed and more serious about its own defence. President Donald Trump can lock in that change—or put it at risk.

For much of the post-Cold War era, many European allies were content with a paper tiger: underarmed, understocked, and unable to fight a major war without the United States. By 2014, European Allies and Canada spent only 1.4 percent of their combined GDP on defense—below the level needed even to maintain military capabilities in peacetime, let alone rebuild them for a major war.

Libya showed the cost. In 2011, Washington tried to let Europe lead. But within 11 weeks, European allies were running short of munitions, forcing the United States, once again, to make up the difference. Barack Obama later faulted Britain and France for failing to carry the burden after Muammar Gaddafi’s fall, calling Libya’s aftermath a “mess.”

Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014 forced NATO to rediscover collective defense. The Readiness Action Plan, the U.S.-led Operation Atlantic Resolve and, from 2017, NATO battlegroups on the eastern flank, restored deterrence and reinforcement planning.

But policy moved faster than capability. The 2014 response did not rebuild Europe’s depleted mass, munitions stocks or industrial capacity. Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 exposed the scale of that failure. Mr. Trump’s return to office turned it into an immediate political imperative: Europe could no longer assume that Washington would indefinitely carry the burden.

The question for NATO leaders gathering in Ankara on July 7 and 8 is not whether NATO remains weak. It is whether the alliance can preserve the impressive gains it has begun to make. A line traditionally attributed to Benjamin Franklin captures the test: “A republic, if you can keep it.”

NATO, if we can keep it.

The danger now is political. Mr. Trump’s pressure has made European allies stronger. But his own conduct could still unravel that progress. His push to acquire Greenland—and the dispute with Denmark that followed—showed how quickly Washington can unsettle allies. He has also cast doubt on NATO’s core bargain by suggesting that allies who miss spending targets may not receive American protection. The Iran war deepened the distrust: even as many European allies provided basing and logistical support for U.S. operations, Mr. Trump accused several of withholding loyalty.

The effect is visible in public opinion. In a May survey by the European Council on Foreign Relations, only 11 percent of respondents considered the United States an ally, down from 22 percent in November 2024. Half saw it instead as a “necessary partner.” For an alliance built on political trust as well as military power, that is a damaging shift.

At Ankara, Mr. Trump should continue pressing Europe to deliver. But he should do so while stating with equal clarity that America’s commitment to NATO’s Article 5 is iron-clad. Pressure cannot make the security guarantee appear conditional. Burden-sharing strengthens deterrence only when the American guarantee remains beyond question.

The evidence of recovery is substantial. European Allies and Canada spent more than $574 billion on defense in 2025—2.3 percent of their combined GDP, after a 20 percent increase in a single year. The balance inside NATO is shifting as well. America’s share of total allied defense spending fell from roughly 70 percent in 2022 to 62 percent in 2025. Mr. Trump can claim credit for helping drive that shift.

Germany illustrates the change. In January 2022, Berlin’s offer of 5,000 helmets to Ukraine became a symbol of Europe’s military complacency. Four years later, Chancellor Friedrich Merz wants the Bundeswehr to become Europe’s strongest conventional army. Germany’s core defense budget is projected to reach nearly €180 billion by 2030.

Ukraine is another result of Vladimir Putin’s failure—and an asset for NATO. He has turned a country long divided over its geopolitical direction into a European military power, bound ever more closely to the West. When Russia seized Crimea in 2014, Ukraine had only about 6,000 combat-ready soldiers. Today, Kyiv plans to retain an armed force of around 800,000 after any cease-fire. It fields Europe’s most battle-tested military and has become a leader in drone warfare.

Ukraine may not join NATO soon. But the alliance should draw it closer now. Joint drone production, defense-industrial cooperation and air-defense integration would strengthen Ukraine while helping NATO absorb the lessons of Europe’s largest war since 1945.

There is an irony in all this. Mr. Trump could still claim a legacy few expected: helping turn NATO from a paper tiger into a stronger alliance than it has been in decades. The method has been rough. The opportunity is real.

Better not to waste it.

Linas Kojala is CEO of the Geopolitics and Security Studies Center. Vytautas Leškevičius is chief policy advisor at the Geopolitics and Security Studies Center and former Lithuanian Ambassador to NATO.

The views expressed in this article are the writers’ own.