Trump Weighs Saudi Nuclear Pact Allowing Uranium Enrichment Without Standard Safeguards
The Trump administration has tentatively agreed to let Saudi Arabia enrich uranium without adopting the toughest international safeguards meant to prevent nuclear weapons development, CNN reported Saturday, citing sources and documents reviewed by the network. The draft deal has been awaiting President Donald Trump’s signature since US-Saudi negotiations concluded in October 2025.
The arrangement would mark a departure from decades of US nuclear diplomacy in the Middle East. Under the source hierarchy for a story like this, the framework closest to a template is the 2009 US-UAE agreement, in which the UAE agreed to forgo enrichment and reprocessing entirely and accept the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, allowing short-notice inspections of undeclared sites.
The Saudi draft would instead rely on a bilateral US-Saudi safeguards arrangement rather than standardized IAEA oversight. This is a distinction nonproliferation experts and members of Congress have flagged as a significant risk in a region where Iran’s own enrichment program has driven years of US pressure.
Delay Tied to Iran War
Two sources familiar with the matter indicated that the ongoing war with Iran. According to Trump, it was launched in part to prevent Tehran from using its enriched uranium to build nuclear weapons and has played a role in delaying his signature on the Saudi accord.
One source said some members of Congress believe the administration is also delaying sign-off because the deal could face a bipartisan disapproval resolution once it is formally submitted for review.
What the Draft Would and Wouldn’t Require
Uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing are the two main pathways to producing the material needed for nuclear weapons. Most countries that need enriched uranium for civilian reactors do not produce it domestically; instead, they purchase it from vendors such as the US or Russia and receive it under strict international supervision.
In a 2025 waiver report to Congress, the administration said the draft bilateral safeguards agreement “employs additional safeguards and verifications measures to the most proliferation-sensitive areas … enrichment, conversion, fuel fabrication, and reprocessing,” and asserted the IAEA “would have the necessary tools” to do its work, i.e., without adopting the Additional Protocol.
The lack of standardized IAEA oversight, combined with the enrichment and reprocessing allowances, has raised concerns among lawmakers on Capitol Hill, according to a source familiar with the matter.
How It Compares With Past Deals
The proposed Saudi framework departs from the so-called “gold standard” set by the 2009 US-UAE deal, under which the UAE agreed to forgo uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing and to adopt the Additional Protocol. Congressional Research Service documentation shows Saudi officials have pushed back on that model for years, arguing the kingdom’s own uranium reserves justify a domestic enrichment capability.
Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman said last year the kingdom intends to enrich its own uranium and produce yellowcake, according to reporting cited in CRS and Arms Control Association materials.
Congressional Review Process
Once a 123 agreement is delivered to Congress, lawmakers have 90 days to review it and can block the deal if both chambers pass a joint resolution of disapproval. Otherwise, it automatically enters into force. Congressional Research Service materials note a further legal complication; a provision of the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act normally bars the executive branch from submitting the required Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement for countries that haven’t accepted enhanced international safeguards.
Bipartisan Concern
Sponsors of the 2009 UAE standard, including senior members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, have said any Saudi deal should meet the same benchmark, per CRS and Arms Control Association reporting.
